In the discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, extreme criticisms of Israel (e.g. Israel is an apartheid state, the Israel Defense Forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians) coupled with extreme policy proposals (e.g. boycott of Israeli academics and institutions, divest from companies doing business with Israel) have sparked counter-claims that such criticisms are anti-Semitic (for only Israel is singled out). Our
1 research shines a different, statistical light on this question: based on a survey of 500 citizens in each of 10 European countries (for a total sample of 5,000), we ask whether those with extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to be anti-Semitic. Even after controlling for numerous potentially confounding factors, we find that anti-Israel sentiment consistently predicts the probability that an individual is anti-Semitic, with the likelihood of elsewhere [Almog 1988] , and while the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism through modern times has been thoroughly explored [Wistrich 1990 , Wistrich 2004 , whether extreme criticism of Israel is de facto anti-Semitic remains bitterly contested, as exemplified in the recent AUT boycott debate (http://www.liberoblog.com).
Our research question is different. Rather than trying to demarcate when anti-Israel statements are anti-Semitic in either effect or intent, we ask whether individuals with strong anti-Israel views are more likely to harbor anti-Semitic attitudes than others. Certainly Bayes' rule would suggest this to be true. Let p be the proportion of the population with anti-Semitic leanings, q be the fraction of those with anti-Semitic leanings who are anti-Israel, and r be the fraction of those not anti-Semitic who are anti-Israel. Then the fraction of those with anti-Israel views who are also anti-Semitic, f, is given by
Presumably those with anti-Semitic leanings would be more likely to espouse antiIsrael viewpoints than those who are not anti-Semitic (given that Israel presents itself as a Jewish state), implying that q > r, which in turn implies that the fraction of those with anti-Israel leanings who are anti-Semitic (f ) exceeds the unconditional proportion of the population that is anti-Semitic (p).
Following the logic of equation (1) there is no need for the proportion of smokers in such studies to mimic the true percentage in the population. As will be detailed below, the consistency of the relationship between anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment across many different analyses makes it difficult to believe that the results obtained are somehow artifactual due to nonresponse bias.
The Anti-Semitic Index. Table 1 reports the 11 statements used in this study to measure anti-Semitism along with the number of respondents who agreed with each proposition. As in prior ADL surveys, an anti-Semitic index was defined by counting the number of statements with which a respondent agreed. Table   1 . From Fig. 1A , the overall fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views equals 14%.
The Anti-Israel Index. Table 2 reports the 4 statements used in this study to ascertain anti-Israel sentiment and the number of respondents who agreed with each. We used the number of these statements agreed to by a respondent to define an anti-Israel index. The higher the value of this index, the stronger the anti-Israel sentiment expressed. Several findings emerge from the results shown in Table 3 . by several goodness-of-fit tests in Table 3 .
While simultaneously considering the factors shown in Table 3 did not meaningfully alter the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel attitudes in the data, these other factors all tested significant in their own right, as can be 11 seen from their associated χ 2 statistics in Table 3 . The important relationships between these factors and anti-Semitism will now be summarized. First, the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views tends to increase with age. Second, relative to Christians, Muslim respondents are much more likely to harbor antiSemitic views (odds ratio = 7.8). There was no statistically significant difference between the fraction of anti-Semitic responses obtained from Jews, other religions, or those reporting no religion as compared to Christians, though those who refused to identify their religion were more likely to harbor anti-Semitic views. Third, the fraction of anti-Semitic responses tended to decline as income increased. Fourth, women were much less likely than men to report anti-Semitic results. Fifth, the level of contact with Jews had no statistically significant relation to anti-Semitism, except that those who did not know how much contact they had with Jews were much less likely to harbor anti-Semitic views (odds ratio = 0.34 relative to those who reported no contact with Jews). Sixth, the less one feels in common with other races/religions, the more likely one is to exhibit anti-Semitism. Seventh, the less tolerant respondents were of illegal immigrants, the more likely they were to harbor anti-Semitic views.
Conclusions. We began this article by noting that extreme anti-Israel sen- Fraction of respondents agreeing with specific anti-Semitic attitudes (see Table 1 ), as a function of the anti-Israel index equaling 0 (dark blue), 1 (red), 2 (yellow), 3 (light blue) or 4 (purple). Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want.
784
Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country.
2,200
Jews have too much power in the business world. 1,309
Jews have lots of irritating faults. 545
Jews stick together more than other (CITIZENS OF RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE).
2,942
Jews always like to be at the head of things. 1,150
Jews have too much power in international financial markets. 1,460
Jews have too much power in our country today. 500
Jewish business people are so shrewd that others do not have a fair chance to compete.
884
Jews are just as honest as other business people. 485 * * Frequency of respondents that disagreed with this statement. 
